

## Recap

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- Last week
  - Double marginalization
  - Supply Chain Coordination
    - Take it or leave it, Marginal pricing
    - Two-part Tariff, Quantity Discount
    - Revenue Sharing
    - Buy-back contracts
  - Risk
  - Voluntary Compliance
- Tues Feb 13
  - Contracts with Sales Effort
  - Contracts under uncertain demand
- Thurs Feb 15: EXAM

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## Revenue Sharing with Sales Effort (CSC)

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- Revenue depends on quantity and effort:  $R(q,e)$
- CSC:  $\Pi^* = R(q,e) - cq - g(e)$ 
  - $g(e)$  is an increasing, differentiable, convex function with  $g(0) = 0$
- Optimal effort:
  - $\partial\Pi/\partial e = \partial R(q,e)/\partial e - g'(e) = 0 \dots\dots (1)$
- Optimal quantity:
  - $\partial\Pi/\partial q = \partial R(q,e)/\partial q - c = 0 \dots\dots (2)$

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## Revenue Sharing with Sales Effort (DSC)

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- Retailer's profit
  - $\Pi(q) = \alpha R(q,e) - wq - g(e)$
- Optimal effort:
  - $\partial\Pi/\partial e = \alpha\partial R(q,e)/\partial e - g'(e) = 0 \dots (3)$
  - Implications?
- Optimal quantity:
  - $\partial\Pi/\partial q = \alpha\partial R(q,e)/\partial q - w = 0$
  - At optimal alpha:
  - $\partial R(q,e)/\partial q - w = 0 \dots (4)$
  - Implications?
- Overall conclusion?

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## Revenue Sharing vs QD

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- Retailer's revenue?
  
- If demand is uncertain, who bears the risk?

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## Quantity Discount with Sales Effort

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## Buy-back Contracts under Uncertainty

- Simple model
  - Single selling period, retail price  $p$
  - Random demand with probability distribution  $F(x)$
- Retailer's expected profit
$$P(q,w,b) = p(q - \int_{0 \rightarrow q} F(x) dx) + b \int_{0 \rightarrow q} F(x) dx - wq$$
Optimal  $q$ :
$$F(q) = (p-w)/(p-b)$$
- The profit of the integrated system
$$P(q) = p(q - \int_{0 \rightarrow q} F(x) dx) - cq$$
Optimum  $q_I$ :
$$F(q_I) = (p-c)/p$$

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## Buy-back contracts

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- $F(q) = (p-w)/(p-b)$
- $F(q_I) = (p-c)/p$  in the integrated system

$F(q_I) = F(q)$  if  $(p-c)/p = (p-w)/(p-b)$

$w=?$   $b=?$

Set  $b = p(1 - \alpha)$ ,  $w = p(1 - \alpha) + \alpha c$  ( $0 < \alpha < 1$ )

$(p-w) = p - p + \alpha p - \alpha c = \alpha(p-c)$

$(p-b) = p - p + \alpha p = \alpha p$

$F(q) = (p-w)/(p-b) = \alpha(p-c)/\alpha p = (p-c)/p = F(q_I)$

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## Price as a Decision

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- Do the contracts still coordinate?
- Revenue Sharing
- Quantity Discount
- Two-part tariff
- Buy-back

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## Recap

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- Previously
  - Supply Chain Coordination
    - Revenue Sharing with Sales Effort
    - Mostly deterministic models
  - Pricing in automotive
- Today Feb 27
  - Contracts with Sales Effort (cont)
  - Contracts under uncertain demand